Russian Peacekeeping Forces in Artsakh: Lessons from the Past
17.02
2025
Part 4
Let’s address the highly relevant and variously assessed mission of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Artsakh. The Russian peacekeeping forces were deployed in Artsakh for a period of five years. Following the joint statement signed by the leaders of Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan on Nov. 9, 2020, they were to remain in Artsakh until mid-April 2024 along the entire length of the contact line and the Berdzor corridor. The November 9 Statement was signed during a time when the 44-day war was ongoing, and Azerbaijan had captured Shushi. The signing of the agreement marked the end of the 44-day war in Artsakh. The following day, Nov. 10, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Russia and Turkey to establish a Russian-Turkish joint center for monitoring the ceasefire in Karabakh. In fact, Russia brought Turkey into the conflict zone, but the Turks could not participate in peacekeeping operations; they could only monitor the ceasefire alongside the Russians.
The primary mission of the peacekeeping forces was to ensure security in the region. During their time in Artsakh, the Russian peacekeeping troops undertook several responsibilities, including maintaining the ceasefire, ensuring the safety of the population, assisting residents in returning to their homes, supporting the peace process, and providing humanitarian aid, while also conducting mine clearance operations during which a Russian peacekeeper was killed.
Despite the presence of peacekeeping forces, a number of ceasefire violations by Azerbaijan were recorded during the aforementioned years, and on Sept. 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched military operations in Artsakh. More than 2,000 peacekeepers became nominal but not actual defenders of the Armenian people on the day of the war, although five Russian peacekeepers were killed by Azerbaijanis on the day of their invasion of Artsakh. However, it should also be noted that from Sept. 20, after the war ended, the Russian peacekeeping forces played a key role in halting the ethnic cleansing in Artsakh and ensuring the security of the people of Artsakh while relocating them to Armenia.
In our opinion, the East-West confrontation, particularly in the process of resolving the Armenian Cause, moved from the early 20th century to the early 21st century. The West did not recognize the November 9 trilateral agreement, and two years after the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces, the Russians did not even have a clearly defined international mandate that would regulate their rights and obligations, as well as the use of weapons.
On Sept. 19, 2023, Artsakh was subjected to ethnic cleansing due to Azerbaijan’s aggression; both Russia and the West were unable or unwilling to prevent this process (three days before Sept. 19, a trilateral meeting on Artsakh took place in Istanbul involving the U.S., Russia, and the EU, and one cannot deny that “understanding” was reached regarding the upcoming events). After the Armenians left Artsakh, there was no longer a need for the peacekeepers to remain there, which served as a basis for the departure of the Russians from Artsakh—this was also part of the Western agenda. As stated by Russian Presidential Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, the Russian peacekeepers left Nagorno-Karabakh because they had no further functions to perform in the region. We think military operations will occur in Artsakh in the future, and the departure of the Russians is temporary to avoid being drawn into provocations.
Among the reasons for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Artsakh are also the mistakes of the Armenian authorities and Russia’s non-allied posture. Particularly after the Prague meeting, the Armenian authorities did nothing to keep Artsakh as Armenian territory; moreover, they recognized Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan. Following Pashinyan’s statement, making decisions regarding Artsakh became nearly impossible for other countries. Unlike Azerbaijan, the Armenian authorities did not lay down any issues before Russia.
Summary
1. In the history of the Armenian people, international forces, Russia, France, England, and the U.S. acted to the extent that their national interests dictated, as a result of which the Armenian Cause has remained unresolved.
2. Peacekeeping forces from all countries, by compromising with the enemy, “forgot” their mission, leaving Armenia and withdrawing.
3. History teaches us that during the operation of peacekeeping forces, we must buy time and act to strengthen ourselves to be able to withstand the threats posed by the political “games” of countries representing the peacekeeping forces.
4. Peacekeeping forces will never “bring” permanent peace; we can achieve that only through our own efforts by skillfully navigating the conflicts of great powers.
5. Countries representing peacekeeping forces usually achieve their goals through secret agreements and treaties with the help of covert diplomacy. We must be extremely cautious in this regard.
6. Countries representing peacekeeping forces—using their status as peacekeepers—extract additional concessions from enemies in order to withdraw from a given country and end their peacekeeping mission.
7. Since peacekeeping forces are driven solely by their own interests, in the event of our weakening, we will lose our share in their interests, suffer stronger blows, and the result will be that we will be least considered.
8. However, this does not mean that countries representing peacekeeping forces—which have prioritized their interests over humanitarian missions—cannot be our allies at various points in history if we correctly assess the combination of interests and the lessons of history.
Thus, it is Armenia’s strength that dictates the question of whether peacekeeping forces should exist in our country or not.
