The Treaty of Gulistan: Lessons from the past and dangerous parallels today
12.09
2025
Part One
On the eve of the Treaty of Gulistan: At the beginning of the 19th century, the main direction of Russia’s strategic plan was to dominate the entire South Caucasus and establish clear and firm state borders with Turkey and Persia, populated by Christian peoples who naturally preferred Russia over Turkey and Persia. Today, unfortunately, Russia seems to have deviated from that strategy, and the results are clearly detrimental to Russia. It is also a fact that, based on its own interests, Russia had long made politically generous promises—particularly to Armenians—dating back to the times of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.
At the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, Armenians were deprived of statehood, and naturally, in that situation, the Armenian Church held significant influence. Russia’s interest in the Armenian Church steadily increased, and it is no coincidence that Russia began to sponsor and encourage proactive, pro-Russian Catholicoi, a practice that Persia was also pursuing. After the death of Catholicos Lukas in 1799, a struggle for the Catholicosate erupted between Russia and Persia, and Daniel, a known supporter of Russian policy, became Catholicos. Persia, for its part, could not tolerate the strengthening of Russian influence in the Caucasus.
The geopolitical situation was interesting back then. At the same time, Napoleon Bonaparte sought to create a strong Turkish-Persian alliance against Russia, assuring both parties that he would provide comprehensive support to the Turkish-Persian armies. It is noteworthy that, during the times of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, there was a belief in the Russian court that Armenian statehood should be restored in the Caucasus, or a joint Armenian-Georgian kingdom should be established. According to this view, the combined forces of pro-Russian Armenians and Georgians would form a serious barrier against Persia and Turkey and function as a kind of buffer state or states. Interestingly, the idea of creating such a buffer Armenian state later emerged among the Turks as well—in March 1914, first expressed during a meeting between a representative of the Turkish government and representatives of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), at the request of the Turkish side.
In Turkey, this idea has persisted — with some interruptions — to this day among certain political circles, as reflected recently by Erdoğan’s political opponent in the Turkish presidential elections and candidate from the Republican People’s Party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. In our view, the idea of a buffer state has, from the mid-19th century to the present, been implemented by the Persian authorities—maintaining close relations with Armenia and seeking a stronger ally, a stronger Armenia. Looking ahead, we believe that the very idea of transforming into a buffer state—which could enable Armenia to occupy an interesting political position between Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the West—should today become one of the main directions of Armenia’s foreign policy. This process, however, must be carried out seriously, professionally, and as a form of political art.
Returning to the main topic, it should be noted that Armenians and Georgians were heavily affected when Russian troops unexpectedly withdrew from the Caucasus. However, the situation changed again when, on Jan. 18, 1801, Emperor Paul I issued a manifesto on the incorporation of Georgia into Russia, responding to King George XII’s request. Initially, Alexander I, who replaced Paul, took a cautious stance but later continued the policies of his predecessors. The course of events changed particularly when the commander of the Russian army, P. Tsitsianov, without awaiting a decision from the Tsarist court, attacked and captured Gandzak. It should be emphasized that Armenian volunteer units fought as part of the Russian forces. The Armenian population of Gandzak welcomed the Russians with enthusiasm.
Naturally, Persia could not accept the loss of Georgia and Gandzak. Considering that England and France had promised assistance, Fath-Ali Shah of Persia and Crown Prince Abbas Mirza began preparing for war against Russia. Indeed, Russian-Persian-Turkish and Russian-French-English relations in the Caucasus were tense.
In May 1804, Gen. Tsitsianov moved toward the borders of the Erivan Khanate. This marked the beginning of the Russo-Persian War, historically known as the First Russo-Persian War—a war to establish control over the Caucasus. After 1805, Russian positions were consolidated, particularly after they captured and established stable control over Karabakh and Shushi. The war continued until 1813, ending in a Russian victory. Persia, weakened economically and militarily, could not overcome the superiority of Russian forces. The prolonged war further exhausted Persia’s resources both in the economy and the military.
