Turkey’s motives and objectives behind recognizing the independence of the Armenian state
10.06
2025
Part Three
To deeply understand the reasons, necessity, and significance of the Treaty of Batum, it is essential to know the preceding events and analyze them thoroughly. These events unfolded rapidly in the diplomatic arena. Let us remember the negotiations in Trebizond (Feb. 27 – April 10, 1918) and Batumi (the first phase: May 11–26), before its dissolution, and the second phase—separate negotiations with the three Transcaucasian republics (from May 30 to June 4). It was clear that the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia were entering a new phase. It was emphasized that despite the heroic battles of May, Turkey’s military pressure continued, making negotiations necessary.
On May 30, negotiations began between the Armenian delegation and the Turkish delegation led by Halil Bey and military representative Wehib Pasha; the talks were conducted in French. It is important to note that alongside these negotiations, Turkish diplomacy was actively advancing the Turkish army’s aggressive push in the Caucasus.
The Armenian delegation prepared three options for negotiations regarding the ultimatum:
- Acceptance with reservations, rejecting certain points,
- Unconditional acceptance,
- A softened version.
During the hour-long negotiations, the Armenian delegation initially tried to return to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and make some concessions, but the Turks did not backpedal on their ultimatum. Moreover, the Turkish delegation demanded that Armenians immediately withdraw their military units from Soviet Baku and its suburbs. It was once again proven that Turkey has never once refused to defend the interests of Azerbaijan, unlike the current authorities of Armenia regarding the issue of Artsakh.
Armenian representatives objected, stating that this was an internal matter of Soviet Baku, but the Turks declared that otherwise the issue would be resolved through military force. Nonetheless, the Turkish side made it clear to the Armenian delegates that they had better accept the ultimatum so that negotiations would continue, as the deadline was only one hour away. On the same day, at 7 p.m., Al. Khatisyan signed the Turkish ultimatum.
It is often forgotten that the ultimatum was presented not only to Armenia but also to the three Transcaucasian republics. It is worth emphasizing that the Azerbaijani delegation also signed the ultimatum without any reservations. The Georgian delegation, with Germany backing it, surprisingly remained silent and only on June 1, at 1 a.m., officially stated that they agreed to the railway deal but not on territorial issues. They tried to justify their position based on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but under Turkish pressure (Wehib Pasha ordered attacks in three directions—Batumi, Natanebi, and Vorontsovka—toward Tiflis), they accepted the ultimatum, after which Wehib Pasha canceled the attack order. In his memoirs, Al. Khatisyan later wrote: “Wehib Pasha and Khalil said, ‘Do the Georgians really believe that Germans will fight Turkey because of Georgia? One should be mad to do so. We have millions of inseparable ties with them.’ It is unfortunate that our country’s leadership still does not understand this. Anyway, the Georgians agreed to cede the predominantly Armenian-populated districts of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe, except for the districts of Akhghuri and Zekar.
Thus, as we see, there was no alternative to the Turkish ultimatum. This was a consequence of the geopolitical and military developments in the South Caucasus. Therefore, the only way to save Eastern Armenia was to accept the Turkish ultimatum and establish peace, no matter how difficult it was because it meant realizing our dream—the independence of the state. Let us note that, as always, the Georgians and Azerbaijanis, taking advantage of Armenia’s difficult situation, sought to advance territorial and border claims against Armenia.
The day after the conclusion of the ultimatum, on May 31, diplomatic negotiations between Armenia and Turkey began. The Armenian delegation continued to raise objections regarding territorial and border issues. Halil Bey introduced his reviewed government, considering some proposals from Armenians. The Turks made some changes and territorial concessions in favor of Armenians, influenced by the heroic battles of May.
An important detail, often overlooked by historians, is that during the negotiations, the Turks tried to avoid discussing Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Georgian territorial and border issues, leaving them to be decided in the Tiflis talks (as suggested by I. Aliyev in recent years). It is noteworthy that the Georgians demanded territories up to Gharakilisa, while the Azerbaijanis demanded territories up to Yerevan (now, this is the plan minimum of the Azerbaijanis, while the plan maximum involves Yerevan as well).
On June 1, the Armenian delegation preliminarily signed the draft treaty. Significantly, Wehib Pasha, on behalf of the Ottoman government, signed the draft treaty, thus recognizing the Republic of Armenia and its independence. Interestingly, after the signing, as Al. Khatisyan recounts, Wehib Pasha took a piece of white cloth with a red cross from his pocket and said, “Here is my project for the Armenian flag. You are Armenian National Christians, and you should be proud of this symbol. I believe the cross should be your symbol.”
In a telephone conversation with the Armenian National Council, Al. Khatisyan summarized the situation: “The spirit of the Armenian land is powerful. We will sign a bad peace treaty, but we will also bring an independent Armenia—a home, a nest where the people’s mind will flourish. All this will unite, elevate the spirit, and it is crucial. I believe in our State.” In our opinion, these words are the most precise and laconic description of the Treaty of Batum.
As a result of the negotiations, Armenia was granted an additional 1,300 square kilometers—along the Hamamlu-Ashtarak highway—and a small piece of land from the southern part of the Yerevan province. Moreover, thanks to the diplomatic efforts of the Armenian delegation, the humiliating treaty was softened and the following points were removed from the draft:
– Right to interfere in Armenia’s internal affairs,
– The Armenian population of the occupied provinces is exempted from military service during the current war,
– The obligation to free Baku from Bolsheviks,
– Right to restore Armenia’s railways and rolling stock independently.
There were also verbal agreements in favor of Armenia, but two days later, the Turks withdrew from several of these agreements, remaining faithful to their maximalist policies.
Between May 30 and June 4, 1918, until the signing of the Treaty of Batum, a real diplomatic battle was underway between the Armenians and Turks, with Armenians having no backing from great powers and Turks close to Yerevan despite the May battles, enjoying the fruits of their victories. These days clearly revealed the Turks’ political strategy, which remains relevant today and from which serious lessons must be learned.
The Armenian delegation expressed dissatisfaction with the Turks’ inflexibility in negotiations. In response, Wehib Pasha explained Turkey’s strategy, which involved step-by-step utilization of all favorable conditions created historically. This policy continues today, but unfortunately, it is again disregarded by the current Armenian government, since the Third Republic of Armenia does not have even a secretly developed national strategic plan since independence.
Let us quote Wehib Pasha’s words: showing the map, he said, “You see that fate will draw Turkey from the West to the East. We have left the Balkans, and we will leave Africa as well, but we must expand eastward. There lies our blood and language. This has a natural pull: our brothers are Baku, Dagestan, Turkistan and Azerbaijan. We must have a way there. And you, Armenians, stand on our path. By demanding Van, you block our way to Persia. By demanding Nakhijevan and Zangezur, you prevent us from descending into the Kur Valley and reaching Baku. Kars and Akhalkalaki block our way to Ghazakh and Gandzak. You must step aside and let us pass. This is our main dispute. We need two broad roads that would allow our armies to advance and defend ourselves: one from Kars-Akhalkalaki-Borchalu-Ghazakh leading to Gandzak, and the other through Shatur-Nakhijevan-Zangezur into the Kur Valley. You can stay in between, around Nor Bayazet and Etchmiadzin.” What a precise characterization of Turkish diplomatic strategy.
The Armenian delegation, in our opinion, gave a diplomatic and professional response, noting that:
- The land left to Armenians is too small to satisfy the Armenian people,
- The Armenian Cause is an international issue and cannot be solved in this manner,
- The borders drawn by the Turks for Armenia should become the basis for eternal hostility between Armenians and Turks.
Wehib Pasha responded that they are well aware of the international nature of the Armenian Cause, and that they are the first to recognize the independence of Armenia. Regarding Armenia’s small territory, he said all states start small and gradually expand, and that the Turks needed the favorable propaganda of the Armenians abroad.
The treaty gives Turkey a major opportunity to expand into Baku, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and beyond, while Armenia becomes an economically weak, landlocked state, posing no threat to Turkey. At the same time, as Al. Khatisyan notes, they were afraid of the discussions regarding the Armenian Cause during a future international conference, so they were trying to resolve the “Armenian Cause” before then.
As the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I approached, Turkey was compelled to accept the fact of the independent Armenian state’s existence, but only within the borders of the South Caucasus, not Western Armenia. At the same time, Turkey was doing its best to prevent the return of Western Armenian refugees displaced by the Genocide and to fundamentally change the demography of Western Armenia—similar to what Azerbaijan is now doing to the Armenians of Artsakh.
Interestingly, during the diplomatic negotiations in Batumi, Wehib Pasha highly praised the heroic actions of Armenians at the battles of Sardarapat and Gharakilisa, and he appealed to the Armenian delegation to create an Armenian-Turkish military alliance, aiming to include 10,000 Armenian soldiers in their forces to fight against the Entente powers. The true author of this proposal was Enver Pasha. By then, the defeat of the Quadruple Alliance was already evident, and the Armenian delegation diplomatically avoided the proposal, citing “the extreme exhaustion of our people.”
Let us note that the Ottoman Empire viewed the existence of three independent states—Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—as a buffer to defend against Russia. At one point, Talaat Pasha stated that they guaranteed the existence of these independent states with the goal of ensuring that Turkey no longer shared a border with northern neighbor Russia. The same view was also supported by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a rival candidate of Erdoğan.
At one point, one of the main organizers of the Armenian Genocide, Bahaeddin Şakir Bey, said that Turkey “is forced to recognize the independence of present-day Armenia and will seek to create a buffer state from this small country against Russia.”
