Why and how the Treaty of Moscow was signed
16.03
2025
Part 2
On March 16, 1921, in Moscow, a treaty was signed between two internationally unrecognized states—The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Kemalist Turkey). Through this treaty, they unilaterally determined the fate of territories belonging to the absent states of Armenia and Georgia, thus violating international legal norms. At the request of the Turkish delegation, the Armenian delegation did not participate in the negotiations. Additionally, at Turkey’s insistence, Lev Karakhan, the ethnic Armenian Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia, was also excluded from the conference. The treaty was formally called the “Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood”, but in fact, it was a strategic Russian-Turkish alliance, leading to the further partition of Armenia. It consisted of a preamble, 16 articles, and an appendix. The first article contained three key points: The contracting parties refused to recognize any peace treaty or international act that was unacceptable to either side. This primarily applied to the Treaty of Sèvres, which was unacceptable to Soviet Russia not so much from the point of view of the Armenian Cause, but rather from the point of view of the status of the straits and the Black Sea. The second clause confirmed Turkey’s territorial claims based on the National Pact adopted by the Ottoman Parliament on Jan. 28, 1920. The third part defined Turkey’s northeastern border, which was described in appendices “a” and “b” and remains in effect to this day.
The northeastern border of Turkey ran along the Akhuryan and Arax rivers, leaving the Kars region, Ardahan, Ardvin, and the Surmalu district—which was never part of Turkey and was not even included in the National Pact—under Turkish control. The Surmalu district covered 3,750 square kilometers, whereas Batumi, which was given to Soviet Georgia, was 3,000 square kilometers.
The second article resolved the Batumi issue in favor of Georgia, even though the National Pact included Batumi within Turkish territorial demands. Turkey agreed to “cede” Batumi city and port to Georgia on the condition that the region would be granted broad autonomy, and Turkey would have free and duty-free transit rights through the Batumi port. In fact, Soviet Russia obtained Batumi by ceding the Surmalu district, which was de jure part of the Republic of Armenia and had never been a part of Turkey, along with Mount Ararat. Let us note that G. Chicherin, who was one of the exceptional Russian politicians who sought Russian interests through the Armenians rather than the Turks, yielded to the pressure of V. Lenin, I. Stalin, G. Ordzhonikidze, and P. Mdivani. During the Moscow negotiations, he ultimately abandoned his previously pro-Armenian stance and declared that they would not insist on drawing the border west of the Arpachay River and south of the Arax River.
The third article addressed the status and border issues of Nakhijevan. It stated that: Nakhijevan would be established as an autonomous territory under Azerbaijan’s protectorate, with the condition that Azerbaijan could not transfer this protectorate to a third party (meaning Armenia). The transfer of Nakhijevan to Azerbaijan under the Moscow Treaty was not only a tangible loss for Armenia (5,500 sq. km) but also posed a strategic threat. Thus, a hostile stronghold was being established behind Armenia, on the left bank of the Arax River, creating a link between Turkey and Azerbaijan and posing a potential threat, particularly to Zangezur. Since Turkish troops were stationed in Nakhijevan, they withdrew from the region in April 1921 in accordance with the Moscow Treaty. The Turks had originally occupied Nakhijevan in the autumn of 1920, allegedly at the request of the local Muslim population.
Thus, the first three articles and the appendix of the Moscow Treaty defined the Turkish-Transcaucasian border. The statuses of Batumi and Nakhijevan and the borders between Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey, as well as between Armenia and the Nakhijevan region, were clarified.
In Article 6, the parties mutually declared all previous treaties that contradicted the interests of both countries null and void.
Article 8 stated that Turkish territory referred to the areas under the control of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Additionally, Turkey was freed from any financial or other obligations to Tsarist Russia.
Article 15 of the treaty obligated Russia to take measures to ensure that the Transcaucasian republics recognized the articles of the Moscow Treaty that concerned them. It said: “Russia undertakes to take measures regarding the Transcaucasian republics so that these republics unconditionally recognize the articles of this treaty that directly concern them in the treaties they will conclude with Turkey.” (We can draw parallels between this and today’s upcoming peace treaty and the fate of Artsakh.)
The Moscow Treaty was Kemalist Turkey’s greatest diplomatic victory. It is rightfully referred to as the “Second Brest.” In the history of international relations and diplomacy, there is no precedent for a newly formed government of a defeated and shattered country, fighting for its survival, to impose its will on the state from which it sought help and support. In fact, it was a treacherous deal made behind the back of Armenia and, to some extent, Georgia.
As historian A. Hakobyan pointed out, the Moscow Treaty was a military-political alliance between Russia and Turkey. From an international legal perspective, the treaty was illegitimate not only because it was concluded without Armenia’s participation but also because neither Bolshevik Russia nor Kemalist Turkey were internationally recognized entities at the time of its signing. From an international legal perspective, a treaty can only be considered valid if it is signed by the legitimate government of internationally recognized states. Therefore, the Moscow Treaty is unequivocally illegal and null and void. Naturally, it is also invalid concerning Armenia, as “treaties can only be binding on the signatory parties and do not create obligations or rights for a third party that is not part of the agreement without its consent.” On Feb. 13, 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also referenced this principle of international law in connection with planned negotiations between the United States and Russia without Ukraine’s participation. Thus, the Moscow Treaty could not impose any obligations on Soviet Armenia, let alone determine the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani borders, especially concerning Nakhijevan. It is also essential to emphasize Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which states the following regarding treaty law: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”
Let us note that after committing systematic betrayal, Armenian communists attempted to protest against the Moscow Treaty. Notably, A. Bekzadyan, S. Ter-Gabrielian, and V. Ter-Vahanian did so. For instance, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Armenia, Alexander Bekzadyan, sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), People’s Commissar for Nationalities J. Stalin, and People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin, protesting against the Moscow Treaty and highlighting its dangerous consequences. However, these protests remained unanswered. At the same time, despite these objections, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia and the leadership of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic did not fight to protect Armenia’s and the Armenian people’s national and vital interests.
If we were to summarize the Moscow Treaty in one sentence, it was not only internationally unlawful but also a tragedy for the Armenian people.
On March 16, 2021, on the eve of the treaty’s 100th anniversary, Russian Foreign Minister Maria Zakharova stated: “Following the spirit and principles of the Moscow Treaty, which has not lost its political and historical relevance over the past hundred years, is the key to further developing relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey.” Moreover, during his speech in the Turkish Parliament on the occasion of the 100th anniversary, Russian Ambassador to Turkey Alexey Yerkhov, noted: “The foundation of friendly relations between the two countries was laid 100 years ago, and it is especially important today, as the security of the region largely depends on it.”
To be continued
