<\/p>\n
It is important to discuss what connection exists between Imamo\u011flu\u2019s arrest and the Kurdish national cause. Previously, Imamo\u011flu pursued a cautious policy regarding the Kurdish issue, but the timing of his arrest is not coincidental. Recently circulating rumors suggest that Abdullah \u00d6calan might make a new statement, influencing Turkey\u2019s political elite\u2019s decisions. Many Kurds in Syria, Turkey, and Europe do not believe that \u00d6calan\u2019s recent declaration about disarming and resolving the Kurdish national cause through political means is genuine. They are convinced that this statement is from MIT (Milli \u0130stihbarat Te\u015fkilat\u0131), Turkey\u2019s national intelligence agency, and they see the attempt to quickly resolve the Kurdish issue as merely an illusion. They believe Erdo\u011fan does not want to lose the votes of Grey Wolves or nationalist parties in parliament.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n It appears Erdo\u011fan is trying to use the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK) and \u00d6calan as leverage to neutralize his opponents. The packaging of this plan is clear: Erdo\u011fan will declare that he has done what no Turkish leader in the last half-century could\u2014solve Turkey\u2019s main threat: terrorism, since the PKK is considered a Kurdish terrorist organization.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Another key question is why Imamo\u011flu was arrested now. This is a simple political calculation: Erdo\u011fan is trying to prevent the CHP from winning in the upcoming local elections in Istanbul. Moreover, considering Turkey\u2019s worsening economy heading toward collapse, Erdo\u011fan will likely have to take tough measures to maintain power amid economic decline. Imamo\u011flu is currently the most popular opposition figure. Despite the weakening of the opposition (such as Kilicdaroglu\u2019s defeat in 2023), Imamo\u011flu retains popularity and is a potential opposition presidential candidate in 2028, whom Erdo\u011fan is trying to neutralize through arrest.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Erdo\u011fan is very experienced in such matters. Since the failed military coup attempt in 2016, he has completely eliminated the G\u00fclen movement, or as Turks call it, the Fetullahists\u2014supporters of Fetullah G\u00fclen, the movement\u2019s founder. Imamo\u011flu is considered a new enemy for Erdo\u011fan, a new Fetullah G\u00fclen who threatens not with religious ideology but with a democratic agenda. Imamo\u011flu\u2019s arrest is a pretext to hinder his political influence and create space for Erdo\u011fan or those under his patronage\u2014namely, current Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Erdo\u011fan\u2019s son Bilal Erdo\u011fan, and the founder of Bayraktar, Seljuk Bayraktar. We believe that removing Imamo\u011flu will open the way for weaker opposition candidates in the 2028 elections.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The next question is whether Russia and the U.S. will try to remove Erdo\u011fan, or will we see a replay of 2016, when Russia\u2019s president personally kept Erdo\u011fan in power and prevented his fall. Today, the U.S. is dissatisfied with Erdo\u011fan\u2019s double game with regard to NATO, Ukraine and Syria; Russia uses him but does not trust him. Washington and Brussels prefer a more predictable Turkish leader. This stance largely depends on the new security architecture in Syria and the issue of Artsakh. Erdo\u011fan is well aware that the approaches of the U.S. and Russia regarding Syria and the Kurds are, to put it mildly, opposed to Ankara\u2019s official stance. Turkey is deeply worried that the U.S. continues supporting Kurdish forces in Syria. Russia also tries to resolve the Kurdish issue without prioritizing Turkey\u2019s interests. Erdo\u011fan is working to prevent foreign interference and strengthen his position for future conflicts.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n What is the connection between Imamo\u011flu\u2019s arrest, the Kurdish issue, \u00d6calan\u2019s call, and Turkish opposition relations? Here are some points:<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In the 2019 Istanbul elections, Imamo\u011flu won partly thanks to Kurdish votes, and Turkey\u2019s nationalist segment views him as \u201celected with PKK support.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Erdo\u011fan understands that the PKK might seek new political maneuvers.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Erdo\u011fan\u2019s political logic involves constantly portraying an enemy to conquer at any cost. After eliminating the G\u00fclen movement, the next target is the Kurdish issue. Erdo\u011fan believes that if the Kurdish issue is resolved, he will need to create a new \u201cenemy\u201d and forge a new image of an adversary\u2014this time, the so-called democratic opposition led by Imamo\u011flu.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In all of this, it must be said that we, as a state and a nation, are interested in several key issues, particularly Erdo\u011fan\u2019s political future in the context of the U\u2024S\u2024-Russia conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The U\u2024S\u2024 and Erdo\u011fan are unstable partners. The U\u2024S\u2024 does not trust Erdo\u011fan, but it cannot get rid of him.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Turkey is a NATO member, but…<\/b><\/p>\n <\/p>\n It is working with Russia on issues related to nuclear power plants, S-400 missile systems, and Syria.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The main concern for the United States is Turkey\u2019s unpredictable political behavior.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n U.S. support for the Syrian Kurds increases Erdo\u011fan\u2019s worries.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Regarding Russia-Turkey relations, Moscow may not want to fully weaken Erdo\u011fan but could exploit his internal problems to push for more favorable deals.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Russia and Erdo\u011fan: Tactical allies or adversaries?<\/b><\/p>\n <\/p>\n They are opponents because:<\/b><\/p>\n <\/p>\n – Turkey continues to supply weapons to Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n – Despite cooperation, Russia does not trust Turkey on Syria.<\/span><\/p>\n – Putin knows Erdo\u011fan is a potentially unstable partner.<\/span><\/p>\n – Erdo\u011fan has strengthened his position within NATO but keeps Russian cards close.<\/span><\/p>\n – Turkey is a rival to Russia in Syria, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus.<\/span><\/p>\n – A more passive, pro-Western leader like Imamo\u011flu could make Turkey weaker, which would benefit Moscow.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n They are temporary allies because:<\/b><\/p>\n <\/p>\n – Despite disagreements, Moscow manages to reach agreements with Erdo\u011fan, leveraging his tendency to seek compromises.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n – Erdo\u011fan\u2019s tough leadership prevents the growth of pro-Western forces in Turkey, which aligns with Kremlin interests.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n – Russia depends on Turkey to bypass Western sanctions (gas, trade, finance, etc.).<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n What could this all mean for Armenia? How might Turkey\u2019s internal instability affect the prospects of Armenian-Turkish relations?<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Erdo\u011fan\u2019s focus is on domestic issues, and Turkey\u2019s relations with Azerbaijan are framed within the Erdo\u011fan-Aliyev agreements. It\u2019s unlikely Turkey will develop any relations with Armenia until Armenia de facto capitulates to Azerbaijan. If the Kurdish issue remains unresolved, Turkey will not look for new pretexts to launch a d\u00e9marche against Armenia. It will accuse Armenia of supporting PKK and Kurdish militants, and as it did in Syria, Iraq, and Artsakh, it may carry out what is called a counter-terrorism operation without consulting anyone.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Could this situation pose a threat to Armenia? If Erdo\u011fan adopts a double nationalist approach, he might escalate rhetoric against Armenia and the Armenian people. However, we believe that Turkey\u2019s internal political and economic decline will push Erdo\u011fan toward more rational policies.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Thus, the arrest of Imamo\u011flu reflects deeper issues beyond merely neutralizing an opposition figure. Erdo\u011fan aims to cleanse the political landscape, eliminate potential rivals, and maintain control after 2028. The U.S. and Russia have different objectives regarding Turkey, but both seek to weaken Erdo\u011fan\u2019s government. For Armenia, this is a clear signal to prepare for all possible developments in Turkish politics.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n One should be ready for the following scenario: If the West, particularly the U.S., uses internal Turkish conflicts to pressure Ankara into opening the closed border with Yerevan and signing diplomatic normalization agreements, Turkey might present this as a constructive gesture to buy time. Opening its own closed border with Armenia could be portrayed by Erdo\u011fan as a favor to Armenia and the world. At the same time, it\u2019s important to understand that changes in Erdo\u011fan-\u0130mamo\u011flu pairings will not fundamentally alter Turkey\u2019s stance toward Armenians and Armenia. Turkey\u2019s official policy toward Armenians and Armenia has remained consistent regardless of leadership changes. Only Erdo\u011fan\u2019s increased pro-Western stance might make Turkey\u2019s policies more predictable, as Russia-Turkey relations could undergo some changes (notably, Imamo\u011flu was recently awarded the honorary citizenship of Paris).<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Now, let us come to the most pressing question: Could Armenia currently find itself on Erdo\u011fan\u2019s list of primary adversaries?<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Possible scenarios include:<\/b><\/p>\n <\/p>\n – If Erdo\u011fan worsens relations with the West, he might exploit Armenia\u2019s situation, claiming Turkey is “alone” and needs to take tough measures.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n – If Azerbaijan becomes involved in new provocations, Turkey could continue supporting it but with new rhetoric against Armenia.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n – If the situation regarding the Kurdish issues escalates, Erdo\u011fan could again accuse Armenia of supporting terrorists (similar to accusations against Syrian Kurds).<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n We believe that at this moment, there is no immediate direct threat to Armenia. However, Turkey could use Armenia at any time as an external \u201cenemy\u201d figure to address internal issues.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Furthermore, Turkey may try to further integrate Azerbaijan into its military-political projects, similar to what was done with the Organization of Turkic States. At minimum, Turkey could conduct several additional military exercises near Armenia\u2019s borders annually, though one should not overestimate Turkey\u2019s strength or underestimate Iran\u2019s and Russia\u2019s roles in the South Caucasus. The latter two are likely to respond strongly to curb Turkey\u2019s ambitions, based on strategic principles like \u201cOCULUM PRO OCULO ET DENTEM PRO DENTE\u201d \u2014 \u201can eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" It is important to discuss what connection exists between Imamo\u011flu\u2019s arrest and the Kurdish national cause. Previously, Imamo\u011flu pursued a cautious policy regarding the Kurdish issue, but the timing of his arrest is not coincidental. Recently circulating rumors suggest that Abdullah \u00d6calan might make a new statement, influencing Turkey\u2019s political elite\u2019s decisions. Many Kurds<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":2544,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[26],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2631","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-research-en"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n