Transformations of Iran’s geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus
15.01
2026
How is Iran changing its position in the South Caucasus, and what impact will this have on the region’s security, economy, and politics?
Below we present the analysis of political analyst Abraham Gasparyan:
The nature of the consensus architecture of the new world order
In the Greater Middle East and the South Caucasus, the disrupted system of military-political and power balances is entering a phase of negative stratification (hierarchy). This means that the Potsdam system of international relations, which has existed for more than 80 years, has come to an end, and states are facing the objective challenge of preserving state subjectivity and functionality within the architecture of a new world order.
The new world order is revising the traditional international and interstate relations theory of balance of power and value consolidation—largely rooted in constructivism—replacing it with the theory of power dominance, or neorealism. In this framework, ensuring state sovereignty and the continuity of institutional functionality no longer depends solely on effective management of internal resources, but rather on the activation of geopolitical factors. Under the new conditions, the gradual transformation of the state’s role is directly linked to the actions of forces and states that pursue policies of geopolitical patronage or seek to overcome the numerous organizational and structural unknowns of international relations.
The structural transformation of the existing world order presupposes a radical reassessment of traditional foreign policy mechanisms, principles, and approaches. In the South Caucasus, geopolitical tectonic shifts are replacing the policies of maintaining “balanced peace” (its imitation) by ruling elites, strategic restraint, security and economic zoning, and preservation of the geopolitical status quo, with an aggressive concept of imposing geoeconomic, communicational, transport, and security interests.
However, the new division of spheres of influence among global decision-making centers will not occur—and will not proceed—without conflict. It may unfold through the revival of the norms of a collapsed international law and the exhausted resources of peacebuilding; through agreements on mutual non-destruction; through secret arrangements among great powers at the expense of the interests of small states that voluntarily or forcibly abandon strategic depth and ambitions; through compromises among states delineating strategic interests (territories, rare metals, oil and gas resources, maritime straits) in the context of China’s threat of economic “neo-colonization”; or through open confrontation.
Events unfolding in Venezuela, in Greenland, and Iran, as well as the reactions to them, suggest that a certain consensus is nonetheless emerging between the United States and Russia regarding the distribution of security and geoeconomic interests and spheres of influence. Proxy wars will continue to take economic, hybrid, cyber-security, and local/regional forms, reducing the likelihood of large-scale or global military operations and shifting confrontation into the domains of communications and control over natural resources.
The foundations of the transformation of Iran’s regional role
Escalating international tensions are characterized not by stable poles, but by predictable hybrid confrontations and short-term alliances. The tightening of Western—primarily U.S.-Israeli—policy toward Iran and the permanent threats of changing its internal agenda (regime, administration, theocratic system), especially after the 12-day Iran-Israel war, have imposed a new reality on Iran’s spiritual, political, and military decision-making centers.
Iran now faces stark choices:
Should it pursue regime change by abandoning its nuclear ambitions, its vital military-political interests in the Middle East, and its patronage of proxy groups?
Should it move closer to the United States in exchange for de-blockade, gradual lifting of sanctions, and investment opportunities?
Or should it continue its exhausted and unpromising anti-Western course, confronting the threat of total loss of sovereignty, internal political and civil clashes, and perpetual instability—without direct patronage or high-quality support from strategic and economic partners such as Russia and China?
The positions of Israel and the United States are clear: altering Iran’s status as an independent regional actor has become a necessary imperative. This would legitimize the neorealist approach to balancing power in the new world order, whereby the capacity for power (military, diplomatic, and soft power) justifies the safeguarding of states’ vital interests while bypassing the mechanisms and normative provisions of international law.
The retreat of political Shiism from Syria and Lebanon, along with worsening economic conditions, has forced Iran to reassess the principles of its militarized foreign policy, overcome new regional challenges, and pursue its interests through diplomatic instruments. Tehran’s strategy of shifting from confrontation to becoming a factor of balance is a consequence of Western pressure policies.
In this context, it should also be understood that in the West–Iran hybrid war, Tehran continues to view the South Caucasus as a security zone, where any uncalculated change in power and influence directly strikes Iran’s national security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. This is despite the fact that, out of fear of further escalating tensions with the West, Iran adopted a loyal stance toward the occupation of Artsakh and reconciled itself to the reality that its once-secure northern borders (prior to the depopulation of Artsakh) became more favorable for Azerbaijan and Israel—at minimum—for anti-Iranian intelligence operations.
The foundations of the transformation of Iran’s regional role can be systematized around several deep structural, ideological, security, and international factors. Amid the transformation of the international system from unipolarity toward positive multipolarity; changes in the regional priority agendas of traditional Middle Eastern actors; the dismantling of Iran’s strategic “Shia Crescent” puzzle; and the de facto military-political capitulation of the “Axis of Resistance” (Iran–Iraqi groups–Syria–Hezbollah–Yemen), Tehran has begun to act not as an “isolated revolutionary state,” but as a regional pole of power.
This shift is accompanied by the “pragmatization” of the state’s ideological model—namely, the flexibilization of the narrative of exporting the Islamic Revolution, or the replacement of hyper-activation of political Shiism with an anti-hegemonic and anti-imperialist discourse, as well as engagement with militarized or non-Shiite Sunni groups in the Middle East (Palestine—Hamas; Lebanon).
Such a tactical shift by Tehran simultaneously counterbalances Turkey’s efforts to neo-colonize the Arab world through “soft power” and diplomacy, via a narrative and policy aimed at achieving pan-Islamic consolidation against Israel.
In other words, Iran’s regional role is transforming because:
The newly emerging global system limits the ability of mid-level regional powers to act independently;
The military activation capacity of Iran’s proxy allies in the region has been sharply reduced;
The ideology of political Shiism has entered a phase of pragmatism;
International economic sanctions are becoming a driver of adaptation;
The conflict with Israel is shaping a new regional logic and political course.
