Opening borders without peace: A risk map

Part Two

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has not been resolved through a peace treaty over Artsakh, and the Artsakh issue, as a central component of the conflict, remains unsettled. Currently, there is only a fragile ceasefire based on verbal agreements. Legally, the parties remain in a state of conflict, and under such circumstances, opening the borders—if presented as a “sign of peace”—carries a number of serious risks. In our view, these include:

1. Risk of intelligence and sabotage infiltrations: Opening Armenia’s border, particularly in border-adjacent areas, would make them vulnerable.
2. Challenges in controlling transport infrastructure: Azerbaijan could attempt to gain control over entry points into Armenia, particularly roads passing through Syunik and Tavush provinces.
3. Energy and communications dependency: If transit lines are controlled by Azerbaijan, Armenia would lose one of the key components of its strategic independence. Notably, the Armenian PM surprisingly announced in the National Assembly that Armenia is creating a unified energy system with Azerbaijan, despite the fact that Armenia exports electricity.
4. Pushing Iran out of Nakhijevan: This would deliver a major blow to Armenia’s security system. Currently, Iran supplies over 85% of Nakhijevan’s gas and electricity, as well as the majority of essential goods, and approximately 40–45% of the population has a pro-Iranian position. Opening the borders would allow Azerbaijan to assume almost the entire role, effectively excluding Iran from the region. Early signs of this are already visible in the electricity sector.

In recent years, Azerbaijan has repeatedly demonstrated that it uses its economy and infrastructure as tools of political pressure—through energy supply stoppages, border provocations, and other methods. Therefore, without clear international guarantees, opening the borders could turn into a serious security vulnerability.

5. Threats to territorial integrity: The Armenian-Azerbaijani border issues remain far from fully resolved. Azerbaijan continues to assert territorial claims, using terms like the “Zangezur corridor” and raising issues about enclaves.

If the borders are opened without clear delimitation, legal safeguards, and without addressing the Artsakh issue—under such humiliating conditions—Armenia, under de facto pressure, may be forced to accept unfavorable border terms. In this case, the process of “opening borders” would more likely become a tool to enforce territorial concessions rather than a step toward peace. The risk is particularly high in Syunik province, which holds strategic importance for Azerbaijan as a bridge to Turkey and the Middle East.

6. Risks for economic markets and capital control: Azerbaijan’s economy is several times larger than Armenia’s, and its state system is highly centralized. If the borders are opened, the following situation may arise:

Azerbaijani capital, through state or semi-state companies, would penetrate the Armenian market, flooding it with cheap, mass-produced Azerbaijani goods—especially in agriculture and food industries. This poses a serious threat to local producers and could lead to the closure of local businesses and loss of jobs.

Therefore, a state defensive policy is needed, particularly through customs and subsidy mechanisms. If Armenia becomes economically dependent on Azerbaijan, this dependence could be exploited for political purposes, restricting Armenia’s sovereign decisions. Economic liberalization must proceed with clear principles of security and balance.

Opening the borders will also bring with it socio-psychological factors. Decades of conflict have created mutual distrust between societies. It is essential that economic processes do not conflict with national security and internal stability interests. Local businesses may come under Azerbaijani influence through loans, investments, or future joint ventures. The near absence of competition could lead to the gradual decline of Armenian enterprises. This would increase economic dependence, which could later be used as a serious political lever by Azerbaijan.

8. Issues concerning displaced and war-affected populations: Opening the borders without resolving political, humanitarian, and social problems could trigger a serious internal crisis. Tens of thousands of displaced persons still do not have final legal status. Opening the border without guarantees for these issues may be perceived as a step imposed on the defeated side, deepening the crisis of national dignity and increasing the spirit of resistance.
9. Risk of political manipulation and external pressure: As noted, Azerbaijan has long built its foreign policy not on mutually beneficial cooperation, but on political blackmail. This approach could again be applied to Armenia—for instance, in exchange for abandoning Artsakh, or changing positions in international organizations, which is already happening.

Without political equality, an open border would become a permanent mechanism of pressure rather than a guarantee of peace.

10. Social and national security issues: Azerbaijan’s state ideology is based on anti-Armenian propaganda, which continues today. Even against the backdrop of peace announcements, Azerbaijani state media and educational systems continue hostile propaganda against Armenia and the Armenian people. Without a fundamental ideological change by Azerbaijan, opening borders could lead to societal tension, a crisis of national dignity, and psychological unreadiness for peaceful coexistence.

Conclusion

1. Economic consequences: Opening the Armenian-Azerbaijani border may be presented as a step toward regional peace, but it carries multilayered risks. Without international guarantees, clear legal grounds for border delimitation, security monitoring mechanisms, and fair resolution of the Artsakh issue, it could lead to a gradual erosion of Armenia’s sovereignty and deepening economic dependence.

Historically, Armenia’s independence has been not only a military or economic matter, but also a question of identity. If 70–80% of imported goods depend on hostile states, any restriction imposed by them could create a serious crisis. Opening borders could bring short-term economic benefits but, in the long term, without a clear state strategy, would increase external dependence and weaken national security.

2. Political consequences: Economics is never purely economic—it quickly becomes a tool of political influence. When key sectors of the state—gas, transport, energy, or investments—depend on external sources, those sources eventually shape political behavior.

In Armenia, this is already visible in several areas:

• Dependence on Russia for gas and the economy often limits Yerevan’s foreign policy freedom.
• Relations with the EU and US are currently negotiated under the guise of democratic reforms and human rights, but in reality, they serve their interests.
• Chinese investments and loans are not yet highly visible, but aim for long-term influence, particularly in infrastructure and technology.

If Turkish and Azerbaijani channels are also opened, this chain of dependence will become even more complex and dangerous:

Turkey and Azerbaijan would convert their economic presence into a lever of political pressure, for example by demanding certain stances on international platforms, limiting goods circulation for internal or external political reasons, and obstructing Armenian strategic projects.

This shows that the economy becomes a primary field of foreign political influence. Without protective mechanisms, Armenia could easily find itself in economic and political chaos.

Economic relations are directly linked to state sovereignty. When strategic infrastructure and financial flows are controlled by external actors, sovereignty becomes not a legal but a practical issue.

Thus, the economic impact of opening the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders is multilayered. Armenia’s development capacity is currently weak, while the risk of new dependencies is high, especially given that preferred economic partners, Iran and Russia, are already present.

Simultaneously, the state must ensure protective mechanisms for local production—subsidies, sound tax policies, and customs protection. Opening borders is not an end in itself. Without economic protection and strengthening the security system, “open borders” will become a source of dependence rather than development.

In this situation, advocating for border openings without strengthening the security system and addressing multilayered issues would be absurd.

Sasun Davidyan, Economist

Armen Sargsyan, Historian