The hidden formula of decision-making in Iran: Theories and reality

Part Two

To better understand how political decisions are made in Iran, let us examine how the decision to pursue a nuclear program was formed.

The initial decisions regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear program were made during the previous regime, under the Shah. In the Islamic Republic, the first phase dates back to the 2000s, when the idea began to take shape that Iran needed nuclear capacity to address a looming energy crisis linked to water scarcity. Naturally, this perception was also largely driven by pressure from the United States, the Israeli factor, and regional threats.

Second phase: Discussions began within the military bloc, primarily involving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, scientific-nuclear teams, and national security bodies. These discussions led to the formation of a core strategy: “nuclear capability without producing or acquiring nuclear weapons.”

Third phase: This stage can be characterized as a struggle between political camps. Two main approaches emerged in Iran:

• the “hardline” approach — to rapidly develop the program
• the “pragmatic” approach — to negotiate and ease pressure

Fourth phase: This is the phase of the “red lines” set by the supreme leader. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defined the key principles:

• not to produce nuclear weapons, but to develop the necessary scientific and technological capabilities
• to continue the program in a controlled manner

These principles became the guiding framework for the entire system behind the program.

Fifth phase: This stage can be described as the decision to implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), during 2013–2015. It was decided to move toward an agreement, and the government began negotiations with the approval of the supreme leader. International negotiations continued until the first presidency of Donald Trump.

Sixth phase: This phase is characterized by the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement. Confronted with this reality, Iran decided to gradually violate the restrictions and advance uranium enrichment levels.

Thus, Iran’s decision-making process regarding nuclear weapons has gone through the following stages:

1. Recognizing the importance of the issue based on security threats
2. Closed-door discussions involving the elite
3. Compromise among different groups
4. Final approval by the supreme leader
5. Implementation

Naturally, such a multilayered decision-making system in Iran has led to various interpretations. The main analytical frameworks explaining Iran’s political decision-making system, each with its strengths and weaknesses, are as follows:

1. Theocratic controlled state: according to this view:

• Iran is primarily a religious state
• The main actor is Khamenei
• Other institutions (president, parliament) are secondary
• Decisions stem from Islamic ideology rather than public demand
• This explains the existence of “red lines,” for example, regarding Israel. It clearly highlights the influence of ideology.

This perspective is mainly promoted by Western analysts.

2. Deep state: This analysis focuses on informal power structures, where the key roles are played by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the supreme leader. There is also a closed network combining the military, intelligence, and the economy. Real political decisions are often made at a shadow level.

3. Elite competition: According to this approach, there is no single decision-making center in Iran; instead, there are various groups:

• conservatives
• reformists
• military elite
• clerical elite

Decisions are the result of internal struggle and compromise.

4. Rational-state interest model: according to this approach

• Iran acts as a calculating, rational state
• Regardless of ideology, decisions are based on security, regional influence, and resources

For example, the nuclear program is seen as a tool of deterrence. This theory is often used by scholars of international relations.

5. Continuation of a revolutionary state: this perspective links everything to the Iranian Revolution, arguing that the system is designed to preserve it. Institutions are built to counter “external and internal threats,” which is why political decisions often follow a revolutionary logic.

Conclusion

Iran cannot be explained by a single theory. In my view, the more accurate picture is the following combination: a deep state, intra-elite competition, a rational–state interest model. Most importantly, Iran’s decision-making system should be seen not as a single mechanism, but as a balance between several power centers operating simultaneously.

This is the political decision-making mechanism of our friendly Islamic Republic of Iran—an institutional system guided by state interests.