Dual game: How Turkey benefits from the Iran crisis

Against the backdrop of the ongoing processes around Iran, Turkey’s role has become multi-layered, requiring precise calculation. Ankara’s goal is to maintain its role for the West, preserve its influence in the Middle East, expand its positions in the South Caucasus and in the broader Turkic world, taking advantage of the current geopolitical tensions. For this purpose, Turkey often tries to present itself as a “mediator” in conflicts such as the Russian–Ukrainian war, Somalia–Ethiopia conflict, as well as the US–Israel–Iran confrontation.

In this climate of tension, Ankara prioritizes maintaining good-neighbourly relations with Iran and Russia, while simultaneously preserving its ties with the United States and NATO. Through this dual game, Turkey seeks to remain an indispensable partner for all sides, viewing this as the foundation for its mediating role.

It is well known that Turkey, by carefully leveraging its geographical position, has always aspired to become a unique economic hub across multiple directions. In the current context of the war against Iran, it is seeking even more strongly to take advantage of the situation and transform itself into an energy and transport hub—becoming a key energy corridor to Europe and thereby strengthening its position as a major transit route (gas, oil, freight transport, etc.). In this context, Ankara is also trying to strengthen its role in the South Caucasus, especially regarding communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Moreover, Turkey has even deployed troops into northern Syria and Iraq without international mandates and justified this through its own “security” rationale.

In light of the developments around Iran, Turkey’s strategy is as follows: in the event of a possible weakening of Iran, to fundamentally attempt to change the balance of power not only in the Middle East but also in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Turkey is particularly trying to strengthen its influence in the South Caucasus by leveraging Azerbaijan and promoting transport projects, especially the concept of the “Zangezur Corridor” (TRIPP). The implementation of this project would significantly limit Iran’s regional role, directly affect Russia and Armenia, and thereby change the regional balance, potentially strengthening Turkey’s role for the West and NATO.

Turkey is seeking to take maximum advantage of the TRIPP project, positioning itself as a partner of the West and NATO while simultaneously acting with greater flexibility in its relations with Azerbaijan. In this context, the idea of the “Zangezur Corridor,” regardless of how it is framed, is being turned into a unique instrument for increasing pressure on Armenia. In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention the view of Abraham Gasparyan, founding director of Genesis Armenia; according to him, one of the US objectives within TRIPP is also to control Turkey’s “political Sunnism.”

It should also be noted that analysts have not yet seriously discussed a new “player” emerging in the South Caucasus—Israel—which has so far chosen Azerbaijan, a Turkish ally, as its foothold. This requires separate analysis.

Turkey also calculates that the weakening of Iran—for example in Central Asia—means:

• a larger space for Turkish economic and cultural expansion will emerge;
• new transport corridors will open toward China or Europe, making Turkey a more demanded transit hub.

However, Iran is emerging from this war with dignity, and the main plans of both the United States and Israel have so far failed:

• The US and Israel failed to bring about regime change in Iran;
• Failed to achieve any tangible results regarding nuclear enrichment;
• Failed to establish control over the Strait of Hormuz;
• Failed to seize Iran’s oil wealth;
• No societal split occurred in Iran; on the contrary, mass protests took place in Israel and the US against their governments;
• The opposition in the US and Israel gained significant leverage for future elections;
• Contradictions emerged between the US and NATO to the extent that the US president even spoke about withdrawing from NATO;
• The strategic cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China was further strengthened.

Thus, although Iran is suffering serious material and human losses in this war, it is currently emerging with dignity. Iran’s strengthening means for Turkey that:

• Turkey will not become a regional hegemon but will remain a key player;
• It will be forced to shift from “aggressive expansion” to a more calculated balancing policy;
• This will create a more favorable environment for Armenia, as the likelihood of unilateral Turkish pressure will decrease, and most importantly, it will open broader diplomatic opportunities—if Armenia chooses to use them.

Turkey’s strategy must be based on a delicate balance, and excessive activity carries serious risks and dangers that will provoke corresponding countermeasures.

In my view, the two main risks for Turkey are:

• Turkey’s strengthening in the South Caucasus will also trigger Russia’s response, as Russia will not want Turkish dominance, especially in the region;
• At the same time, Iran will take retaliatory steps, including through proxy forces; tensions with Iran will increase.

The question arises: how do several manifestations of Turkey’s policy affect Turkey–US–NATO relations? This will be discussed next.